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organization ― large or small ― can become
digitally aware, connected and smart. With so much
technology and networking available at such low

INTRODUCTION
The geometric rate of improvement of transistor
size and integrated circuit performance, known as
Moore's Law, has been an engine of growth for our
economy that has enabled new products and services,
created new value and wealth, increased safety, and
removed menial tasks from our daily lives.
Affordable, highly integrated components have
enabled both life-saving technologies and rich
entertainment applications. Anti-lock brakes, insulin
monitors, and GPS-enabled emergency response
systems save lives. Cell phones, internet appliances,
video games, and mp3 players enrich our lives and
connect us together. Over the past 40 years of silicon
scaling, the increasing capabilities of inexpensive
computation have transformed our society through
automation and ubiquitous communications. In this
paper, we will present the concept of the smarter
planet, how reliability failures affect current systems,
and methods that can be used to increase the reliable
adoption of new automation in the future.

cost, what wouldn ’ t you enhance?[1]” In these
documents, IBM discusses increased computer
automation of roadways, banking, healthcare, and
infrastructure, as automation could create more
efficient systems that could reduce traffic jams,
increase transparency in the financial institutions,
increase information connectivity between doctors
and hospitals, and reduce infrastructure strain.
Increasing computation, though, necessitates that we
increase reliability, as unmitigated failures in
automobiles, infrastructure, medical-implantable
devices and avionic systems could be dangerous.
In particular, we have found that with extremescale systems or systems in extreme environments,
the effect of radiation-induced failures can dominate
other reliability problems. In extreme-scale systems,
such as supercomputing or infrastructure computing,
the vast number of components in the system
contribute to increase the likelihood of radiationinduced failures. In extreme-environment systems,
such as avionics, the heightened radiation
environment increases the likelihood of radiationinduced upsets. To illustrate both the exteme-scale
systems and the extreme environment systems, we
will present examples from automotive and avionic
systems.

THE SMARTER PLANET
Recently IBM has been presenting the idea of a
“smarter planet.” In smarter planet documents IBM
states, “With computational power now being put
into things we wouldn’t recognize as computers, any
person, any object, any process or service and any
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Figure 1: Worldwide mean-time-to-upset in hours for different car memory sizes.

Figure 2: Mean-Time-To-Upset (MTTU) decreases as feature sizes shrink [shown at a flux of23,082 neutrons-cm2/hour
corresponding to the flux seen by an airplane flying at 60,000 feet over the North Pole where the magnetic field lines converge];
sensitivity per bit (Bit-Cross-Section) does not show direct correlation with feature size.

memory, a single-event upset will occur
approximately every 3.6 hours. For the computerdriven Grand and Urban Challenge [3] cars, such as
Little Ben [4], which can have up to 128MB of
memory, the MTTU is 12.6 seconds. These
autonomous vehicles are indicative of the level of
electronics we may see in cars over the next 10–20
years as automobile electronics continues to assist
with more of the driving functions, such as
automated parking and distance sensing cruise
control.
While error-correcting codes will likely correct
some of these errors in both of these scenarios, the
increasingly likelihood of multiple-bit upsets, where
a single ionizing particle creates multiple memory bit
flips, can make correcting the errors expensive.
Depending on the layout of the memory devices,
multiple-bit upsets can be as high as 90% [5] of all
events. Furthermore, single-event functional
interrupts that destroy entire pages of memory are
now as common as single-event upsets in dynamic
random access memories (DRAMs). While there are
many error-correcting codes that can correct multiple

AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS
One area of recent concern has been the
reliability of cars. The most recent car reliability
standard, “Failure Mechanism Based Stress Test
Qualification for Integrated Circuits (AEC-Q100Rev-G),” states that “Soft Error Rate (SER)] testing
is needed for devices with large numbers of SRAM
or DRAM cells (≥ 1 Mbit). For example: Since the
SER rates for a 130 nm technology are typically near
1000 FIT/Mbit, a device with only 1,000 SRAM
cells will result in an SER contribution of 1 FIT.” In
Figure 1 the mean-time-to-upset (MTTU) in hours is
shown for the worldwide population of cars as a
function of the memory capacity in each car. These
calculations take into account that approximately 250
million [2] cars are on the road every day with an
average time on the road of three hours. Of the 250
million cars, we assume that the new cars are more
likely to have more memory, so the MTTU is further
rated to indicate that 60% of all cars on the road are
manufactured in the last ten years. From this graph
we see that if all of these cars had only 1Mb of
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In the past we have used accelerated radiation
experiments to measure the sensitivity of the device
to radiation, called the cross-section. As these
devices leverage memory cells, the sensitivity to
radiation-induced failures is similar to traditional
memory, such as static random access memory
(SRAM). Figure 2 shows that while the per-bit
cross-section has not changed much over several
generations of FPGAs, the device's MTTU at
airplane
altitudes
continues
to
decrease
exponentially. As shown in Figure 3, this correlation
is due to the increasing amount of memory used in
each generation of FPGAs. Therefore, even if the
sensitivity to radiation decreases on a per-bit basis,
the increasing number of bits in the component
negates these effects.
Unlike the automotive
example, the use of error-correcting codes is not
useful for FPGAs. In these cases, triple-modular
redundancy is used to mask the effect of radiationinduced failures until the system can be reset.

faults simultaneously, such as Reed-Solomon, often
times they require a particular memory usage pattern
that will make random accesses to memory very
expensive.

AVIONIC SYSTEMS
In avionic systems we have seen an increase in
the use of Field-Programmable Gate Arrays
(FPGAs). FPGAs are programmable devices where
the user's circuit is implemented in programmable
logic and routing. Due to the flexible architecture,
these devices have always been popular for image
processing. Recently, we have seen real-time image
processing systems being incorporated in unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs). These systems can collect
real-time images from an aerial vantage point and
can be helpful guiding wild fire firefighters to and
from the hottest parts of the fire or supporting intheater warfighters.

Figure 3: Chip capacity continues to increase as feature sizes shrink; capacity increase correlates well with decreasing MTTU.

brought reliability researchers from many different
fields together to discuss current and future
reliability problems. After discussing these problems
with the areospace, consumer, infrastructure, largescale, and life-critical industries we found several
key points these researchers converged on:
 Reliability problems in electronic systems must
be addressed but the cost of mitigating reliability
problems is expensive,
 Information regarding the reliability of
electronics is hard to determine and often comes
too late in the design cycle to address it,
 No single layer of the computing stack has
enough information to mitigate reliability
problems efficiently, and
 The onus for system reliability should be shared
across the computing stack.

CROSS-LAYER RELIABILITY
In both of these previous examples, it is necessary
to mitigate radiation-induced failures in electronics
to ensure reliable system execution. Unfortunately,
radiation is only one source of reliability problem
with modern electronics. In many current systems
all of these reliability problems are mitigated at the
hardware level, so that errors are not observable in
the operating system or application. We are finding,
though, that the need to mitigate all of these
problems in the hardware is expensive in terms of
area and power increases tohardware devices. To
combat these problems NSF funded a Computing
Community Consortium Visioning program in
Cross-Layer Reliable Computing [6] to study new
methods of reliability engineering. This program
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Because of these problems, system reliability is
often designed as shown in Figure 4. In this
scenario, the hardware layers focus on preventing
reliability failures and the software layers are blind to
reliability failures. The solution to these problems is
to build systems that are designed for repair, can
filter errors, can detect and correct errors, can adapt
to changing scenarios and environments, and degrade
gracefully as the system comes to the end of its
usable life.

Figure 5: Cartoon Illustration of Cross-Layer Cooperation

Moore’s Law feature-size scaling has been an
economic and capability engine fueling wealth
creation and quality-of-life improvements for the
past 40 years. We are now moving into a
qualitatively new regime where device energy will
be the dominant limitation for the exploitation of
additional capacity and where device are inherently
unpredictable and unreliable. In this new regime our
old solutions to reliability no longer make sense and
will lead to an early end to the benefits of scaling.
However, by exploiting information rather than
energy to tolerate errors at higher levels in our
system stack, we can productively exploit these
smaller technologies to continue reducing energy
while ensuring high system-level safety.

Figure 4: System Stack and Reliability

An illustration of cross-layer system design is
shown in Figure 5. In this illustration the application
layer determines a bound on the value x. Unlike
conventional systems, the cross-layer version shares
this information with lower layers. The architecture
layer can use this bound to detect misbehaving
hardware. However, the architecture layer does not
need to capture and correct the problem. When it
does notice misbehavior, it can signal the the
middleware and OS layers to contain and correct the
error before it becomes visible to the application. We
are beginning to see scattered solutions with this
flavor. Nonetheless, this approach demands a
wholesale paradigm shift in the way we design and
engineer computer systems. Multi-level solutions
are not without their precedent in today’s computer
systems. They are regularly employed to protect
storage and communications. While multi-level
solutions have been useful in protecting bulk storage,
such as DRAMs and persistent storage, similar
solutions for computation currently do not exist. In
part, the heterogeneous design of computing systems
and their ability to transform data makes posing
simple solutions that do not rely on brute-force
replication difficult.
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